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SUMMARIES 
This paper investigates the origins of the 
concept of mathematical truth by focusing on the 
development of algebra in England in the early 
19th century. In particular, it investigates the 
reasons why the English, despite their attention 
to the elements of abstract algebra, never produced 
a system comparable to modern algebra. Special 
consideration is given to the works of George Peacock, 
Augustus DeMorgan, William Whewell, and John Herschel. 
It is argued that what separated the early development 
of English algebra from modern algebra is a fundamental 
difference between 19th- and ZOth-century views of 
truth. 
Dans cet article, nous examinons les origines du 
concept de v&it& mathgmatique en centrant notre at- 
tention sur le d&eloppement de l'alghbre en Angle- 
terre au debut du 19e siecle. Plus pr&is&ment, 
nous Qtudions les raisons pour lesquelles les anglais, 
malgr6 leur int&r&t pour les Qlgments d'algebre ab- 
straite, ne produisirent 2 aucum moment un syst&me 
comparable 2 l'algbbre moderne. Les oeuvres de George 
Peacock, d'llugustin DeMorgan, de William Whewell et 
de John Herschel feront l'objet d'une attention parti- 
culiere. Nous soutenons que ce qui distingue les 
premiers developpements de l'algsbre anglaise de 
l'alg&bre moderne est une diffgrence fondamentale dans 
la conception de la v&it6 au 19e siecle d'une part, 
et au ZOi&me sibcle d'autre part. 
In dieser Abhandlung werden die AnfZnge des Begriffs 
der mathematischen Wahrheit untersucht, wobei die 
Entwicklung der Algebra in England im friihen 19. Jahr- 
hundert im Zentrum steht. Insbesondere werden die 
Griinde untersucht, warum die Engl;inder trotz der Beacht- 
ung, die sie den Elementen der abstraketen Algebra 
schenkten, kein mit der modernen Algebra vergleichbares 
System schufen. Vor allem werden die Arbeiten von 
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George Peacock, Augustus DeMorgan, William Whewell und 
John Herschel betrachtet. Dabei wird folgende These 
vertreten: Der Unterschied zwischen der friihen Entwick- 
lung der englischen Algebra und der modernen Algebra 
liegt in den grunds;itzlich verschiedenen Auffassungen 
des 19. und des 20. Jahrhunderts vom Begriff der Wahrheit. 
One of the major developments of 19th-century mathematics 
is that the concept of mathematical truth, evolved from 
heing one of an objective truth about an external subject 
matter to one of a purely abstract truth based merely on the 
logically consistent development of an arbitrary axiom system. 
Much of the history of 19th-century mathematics has been 
strongly colored by an interest in finding traces and roots of 
this abstract view of mathematics within 19th-century develop- 
ments. One place where questing historians have searched for such 
precursors to the modern view is in the English development of 
algebra early in the 19th century. 
The standard interpretation of the work which was done in 
this area was succinctly stated by Eric Temple Bell, who wrote: 
"It was an Englishman, George Peacock, . . . who first perceived 
common algebra as an abstract hypothetical-deductive science..." 
[Bell 1954, 1801. More recently, Lobog Nov$ has reaffirmed 
Bell's basic position, writing: "The ideas of the English 
mathematicians about the new approach to algebra . . . marked the 
modern approach to algebra and perhaps of the whole of modern 
mathematics" [No& 1973, 1991. Within this general approach, 
which emphasizes the abstract nature of mid-19th-century 
English algebra, more detailed studies of the work of the English 
algebraists have been undertaken. In his Ph.D. thesis, "A New 
British Concept of Algebra," Daniel Clock meticulously examined the 
work of Peacock, DeMorgan, and several of their contemporaries. 
His dissertation ended with the question "How abstract were 
their algebras?" In his final chapter, Clock analyzed the 
claim that they had formulated a modern approach to the subject 
[Clock 19641. Similarly, Elaine Koppelman's masterful study of 
the origins of English algebra in the calculus of operations 
closed with an examination of the progress of the men of the 
period toward developing an abstract algebra [Koppelman 19711. 
The authors of all of these works have in common a desire to 
evaluate how close the English algebraists came to current 
mathematical ways of thinking. It has been as precursors to 
modern views of algebra that English mathematicians from 1830 
to 1850 have claimed the attention of historians. 
Studying them this way has been strangely paradoxical, 
however. For ultimately, detailed examination of their work 
leads to a conclusion similar to Clock's: "The . . . principal 
aspects of a concept of abstract algebra were rather clearly 
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enuciated during that period. The actual construction of a 
genuinely abstract algebra remained yet to be accomplished" 
[Clock 1964, 1661. Since they had the elements but never 
constructed the system, the work of the English algebraists 
seems incomplete and often contradictory from a 20th-century 
standpoint. Despite the excellent, detailed studies which 
have already been done, the nature of English algebra seems 
oddly elusive. 
The solution to this problem does not lie in more and more 
detailed studies of English algebraic works. Rather, it re- 
quires broadening the field of inquiry to include the context 
within which that work was pursued. The issue which separates 
early English algebraic development from modern algebra is ul- 
timately grounded in a fundamental difference between 19th- and 
20th-century views of truth. For an English mathematician in 
the early 19th century to devote himself to developing an ab- 
stract algebraic system would have required a major change not 
only in the interpretation of the nature of mathematics, but 
more generally in the view of human knowledge. Within the 
wider framework of contemporary English culture one can find 
a context which illuminates their apparent failure to develop 
mathematically abstract algebras. In the 19th-century English 
view, mathematical investigation involved the scientific study 
of an external subject matter , and not merely the logical develop- 
ment of theorems from given axioms and definitions. The truth 
of a mathematical investigation, the goal after which the 
mathematical researcher was striving, lay in the subject matter 
his axioms and theorems described. The empty form of the 
mathematical structure had no truth or value of its own. 
The abstract view of mathematics is one in which the emphasis 
in algebraic investigation lies in the form rather than the 
subject matter. The mathematician's goal is to explore and 
develop a logical structure without content which can be 
applied equally to the interpretation of a variety of subjects. 
Such interpretation is not a primary goal of the mathematician, 
however. The truth he seeks is that of completeness and con- 
sistency within the formal structures themselves. 
In the first half of the 19th century, a number of English 
mathematicians focused their attention on formulating a clear 
interpretationof the foundations of algebra. They were faced with 
explaining the status of entities, like imaginary numbers, which 
had no place in the quantitative subject matter of mathematics 
but which often played important roles in the logical form. 
Their challenge was essentially to mediate between the blind 
results created in the consistent development of mathematical 
systems and the subject matter these systems were supposed to 
describe. One approach to this conflict is to emphasize 
mathematics as logical development and to ignore its relation to 
a particular subject matter. Nineteenth-century English mathe- 
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maticians took another approach which was more in line with 
their interpretation of the nature of the human intellectual 
endeavor. 
The view of mathematical truth which informed the English 
development of the foundations of algebra was an integral part 
of a perception of truth which permeated their view of the 
world. In her provocative work, Science in Culture 119781, 
Susan Cannon has identified a belief in science as the "norm" of 
truth which colored the attitude of English intellectuals in all 
phases of their endeavor. Cannon explores the interconnecting 
ideas of a group of men, dubbed "The Cambridge Network," which 
includes the major figures involved in the development of English 
algebra. When the work of the English algebraists is viewed as 
a part of this broader intellectual and social context, their 
attitudes toward the foundations of algebra become clearer. 
This paper focuses on four major figures active in English 
science and mathematics between 1830 and 1860, in an attempt to 
clarify English views of mathematical truth and their relation- 
ship to developing perceptions of algebraic foundations. George 
Peacock and Augustus DeMorgan were two pivotal figures in the 
development of English algebra; their friends, William Whewell 
and John Herschel, considered the nature of mathematical truth 
in a more general context. One can reconstruct the basic in- 
tellectual framework which both supported and limited the de- 
velopment of English algebra by considering the algebraic develop- 
ments against the backdrop of these men's interpretations of 
mathematical truth. 
GEORGE PEACOCK AND WILLIAM WHEWELL: ALGEBRA WITH 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENT FORMS 
Peacock and the Principle of Equivalent Forms in Algebra 
The work of George Peacock is usually viewed as the first 
contribution to a view of the foundations of algebra which was 
developed and revised by a number of his colleagues in the 
decades following its first publication. While a tutor at 
Trinity College, Cambridge, Peacock published two works on 
the foundations of algebra: "A Treatise on Algebra," published 
in 1830, followed in'1833 by a "Report on the Recent Progress 
and Present State of Certain Branches of Analysis," in which he 
explicitly formulated a number of the ideas implicit in the 
earlier "Treatise." 
The problem which Peacock was addressing in his discussion 
of the foundations of algebra can be illustrated as the problem of 
negative (or similarly as the problem of imaginary) numbers. 
In arithmetic, the science which dealt with quantity, neither 
negative nor imaginary numbers were possible. The basic con- 
cept of quantity as exhibited in the external world did not 
admit of any but positive manifestations. Given two numbers, 
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one could not subtract the larger form the smaller--to maintain 
that one could do so was as absurd as maintaining that one could 
give each of seven people an apple when only four apples were 
available. Therefore, in arithmetic, one could not talk about 
subtracting one number from another without the additional 
restriction that it must be a smaller number which was subtracted 
from a larger. This restriction was removed, however, in passing 
from arithmetic to "symbolical algebra." In symbolical algebra 
one was able to use the expression a -b where a and b were allowed 
a universal signification , without any restriction being placed 
on the relative sizes of a and b. This removal of the defini- 
tional restriction on an arithmetic process led to a new kind 
of mathematical entity, a negative number, which was not a 
classical quantity and yet which could be carefully manipulated 
to generate true results. Not part of the idea of quantity on 
which arithmetic rested its foundations, the use of these en- 
tities in algebra raised the problem of how to interpret their 
truth status. 
In treating the problem of negative numbers, Peacock first 
made it clear that their nature could not be explained merely 
by reference to a process of generalization. He specifically 
argued that it was an abuse of the term "generalization" to use 
it to describe the process by which one passed from "the meaning 
of a-b when a is greater than b, to its meaning when a is less 
than b." He explained the issue as follows: 
The operations in arithmetical algebra can be previously 
defined, whilst those in symbolical algebra, though 
bearing the same name, cannot: their meaning, however, 
when the nature of the symbols is known, can be generally, 
but by no means necessarily interpreted. The process 
therefore, by which we pass from one science to the 
other is not an ascent from particulars to generals, 
which is properly called generalisation, but one which 
is essentially arbitrary, though restricted with a 
specific view to its operations and their results 
admitting of such interpretations as may make its 
applications most generally useful. [Peacock 1833, 1941 
"Universal arithmetic" was the symbolic subject which was 
obtained from arithmetic strictly by generalization. In this 
subject, the general rule that a2 - b2 = (a - b).(a + b) was one obtained 
by induction from arithmetic particular cases. In universal 
arithmetic such an expression was true only for numerical 
values a and b where a was strictly greater than b. One could 
not claim that it was true without the explicit restriction. 
For if a were set equal to 2 and b to 4, one would obtain the 
result that 22 -42 = (2 -4)(2 +4) which was arithmetically meaning- 
less. Essentially, Peacock averred, a number was a number, and 
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no analogies constructed with debits and credits could change 
the basic concept, which did not include negative numbers. 
As Peacock described it, the process by which one could 
pass from the restricted domain of universal arithmetic to the 
wider area of symbolical algebra which included such quantita- 
tive anomalies as negative numbers was a "formal" one [l]. 
Rather than relying on the quantitative referent as the subject 
matter which would ultimately tie together the symbolical mani- 
pulations one was working with, the foundations of symbolical 
algebra lay in the relationships which held universally among 
the symbols. Thus, in symbolical algebra one would start with 
a form like a 2 - b2 = (a-b).(a +b) considered as a universal state- 
ment. In the algebraic system a and b were defined by their 
positions in this and other forms, not by a previous understanding 
of the concept of quantity or number. Thus one had a symbolic 
system whose integrity did not lie in a particular external con- 
cept which it described, but rather in the basic forms of the 
system itself. 
Peacock was very specific about the essential difference 
which thus lay between the foundations of universal arithmetic 
and symbolical algebra. Universal arithmetic was the study 
developed by generalizing from arithmetic. In it, one proceeded 
to generate the forms of the science from the definitions of 
the arithmetic terms. The only difference between this study 
and that of arithmetic lay in the generality of its terms. On 
the other hand, the process by which one generated symbolical 
algebra was a formal one, which reversed the order of the steps 
taken to create universal arithmetic. In symbolical algebra 
one started with forms which were imbued with universal signi- 
ficance, manipulated these forms according to specific rules, 
and finally interpreted the results. All of these processes 
were essential parts of algebra. 
Peacock's characterization of algebra seems strikingly 
modern. The system was a symbolic one; it's elements were 
defined by their relationships within the system. The defini- 
tions of the subject matter did not intrude upon the mathematical 
development, as was the case in universal arithmetic, which was 
constrained by the limits of the concept of quantity. However, 
the above formulation was incomplete from Peacock's point of 
view because it suggested an arbitrariness which was not really 
legitimate. Symbolical algebra could not be developed freely 
from'an arbitrary set of assumed forms. It was a science which 
had to correspond to universal arithmetic at any point where 
the two subjects overlapped. For this reason, the forms which 
one could use within a symbolical system were greatly restricted--in 
fact they had to be identical with those found in arithmetic. 
Peacock wrote: 
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. * . though the science of arithmetic, or of 
arithmetical algebra, does not furnish an adequate 
foundation for the science of symbolical algebra, 
it IIeceSSarily suggests its principles, or rather 
its laws of combination; for in as much as symbolical 
algebra, though arbitrary in the authority of its 
principles, is not arbitrary in their application, 
being required to include arithmetical algebra as 
well as other sciences, it is evident that their 
rules must be identical with each other, as far as 
those sciences proceed together in common....[Peacock 
1833, 1951 
At first glance it perhaps seems restricted but eminently 
reasonable that the forms of symbolical algebra be suggested by 
those generated in arithmetic if one were going to require that 
in the areas where arithmetic and symbolical algebra overlap 
they be identical. But there are aspects of Peacock's work 
which suggest that his reliance on arithmetic as the science 
of suggestion was stronger than that. For example, in the 
"Report" he wrote: 
The greatest part of such equivalent forms result 
from the direct application of the rules for the 
fundamental operations of algebra, when these rules 
regard symbolical combination only: but in other 
cases, the operations which produce them being 
neither previously defined nor reduced to symbolical 
rules, unless for some specific values of the symbols, 
we are compelled to resort . . . to the results 
obtained for such specific values, for the purpose 
of discovering the rules which determine the sym- 
bolical nature of the operation for all values of 
the symbols. [Peacock 1833, 1981 
Here Peacock referred to instances where the initial structure 
of the system was incomplete; forms have arisen within it which 
have no interpretation within the original structure of the 
system. One must then refer to the external referent of arith- 
metic in order to discover the rules which, once generated in 
the specific case, can be made to hold universally for symbo- 
lical algebra. The principle which allowed this process of 
borrowing forms from algebra and embedding them with universal 
signification into algebra was labeled the "principle of equi- 
valent forms" by Peacock. 
Whatever equivalent form is discoverable in arithmetical 
algebra considered as the science of suggestion, when the 
symbols are general in their form, though specific in their 
value, will continue to be an equivalent form when the 
symbols are general in their nature as well as in their 
form. [Peacock 1833, 1991 
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If one accepts the view that Peacock did not reaily believe in 
the possiblility of constructing a closed algebraic system, then 
the need for this principle is clear. 
One of the difficulties in placing Peacock's work within 
linear historical development of algebra, however, is that he 
does not seem to affirm consistently that algebraic systems 
are necessarily incomplete and hence need to rely on sporadic 
borrowing using the Principle of Equivalent Forms for their 
development. Even when he did not insist on the incompleteness 
of algebraic systems, the "principle" remained an important part 
of Peacock's algebraic structure. 
. . . we may proceed with the investigation of the 
fundamental rules for addition, subtraction, multi- 
plication and division, and of the theorems for the 
connection of multiples, and for the multiplication 
and involution of powers of the same symbol, which 
will, in fact, form a series of assumptions which 
are not arbitrary, but subordinate to the conditions 
which are imposed by our hypotheses: but if we sup- 
pose those conditions to be incorporated into one 
general law l-the priciple of equivalent forms], 
whose truth and universality are admitted, then 
those assumptions become necessary consequences 
of this law, and must be considered in the same 
light with other propositions which follow, directly 
or indirectly, from the first principles of a demon- 
strative science (emphasis mine). [Peacock 1833, 2071 
Thus Peacock accepted the principle of equivalent forms, basically 
an affirmation of the consistency of the forms which could be 
developed from algebraic axioms, as axiomatic. It was on this 
principle that the truth of his algebraic system rested. 
This use of the principle of equivalent forms as a way to 
keep algebra a demonstrative science is clarified and elaborated 
in the philosophical writings of Peacock's friend and colleague, 
William Whewell. These men had known each other since their 
days as undergraduates at Cambridge when they were both active 
in the Cambridge Analytical Society. Whereas Peacock's intel- 
lectual energy centered largely on the development of algebraic 
foundations, Whewell's interests turned to scientific philosophy. 
In 1840, he published a voluminous Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, wherein he expounded a nativist philosophical system 
in detail. Here he showed specifically how Peacocks's principle 
of equivalent forms fits into an overarching interpretation of 
mathematics and mathematical truth. 
William Whewell: The Principle of Equivalent Forms in Philosophy 
In his philosophical work, Whewell set himself the task 
of understanding the nature of scientific knowledge. He clari- 
fied the scope of his interest as follows: 
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The Sciences to which the name is most commonly and 
unhesitatingly given, are those which are concerned 
about the material world; . . . . And in all these 
Sciences it is familiarly understood and assumed, 
that their doctrines are obtained by a common 
process of collecting general truths from particular 
observed facts, which process is termed Induction. 
It is further assumed that both in these and in 
other provinces of knowledge, so long as this 
process is duly and legitimately performed, the 
results will be real substantial truth. [Whewell 
1847 I,21 
As this introduction suggests, the major issue which Whewell 
was addressing was the question of how one could collect "general 
truth from particular observed facts," the problem of induction. 
Whewell's solution to the problem of induction was a nativist 
one: he continually emphasized the importance of the mind as 
an active power in forming scientific theory. Induction, in his 
view, was not achieved by recognizing patterns or relations which 
adhered in a given collection of facts or specific instances. 
Rather, scientific theories were induced from a series of obser- 
vations when the mind applied a concept which integrated the 
observed data into a coherent whole. Thus he wrote: 
In each inductive process, there is some general 
idea introduced, which is given, not by the pheno- 
mena, but by the mind. The conclusion is not 
contained in the premises, but includes them by 
the introduction of a new generality. In order 
to obtain our inference, we travel beyond the 
cases we have before us; we consider them as exem- 
plifications of, or derivations from, some ideal 
case in which the relations are complete and intel- 
ligible. We take a standard, and measure the facts 
by it: and this standard is created by us, not offered 
by Nature. [Whewell 1837, 1731 
The major challenge in the sciences, then, was to identify the 
basic intellectual concepts which were the ordering principles 
behind the perceived phenomena. 
Within Whewell's philosophical construction, mathematics 
was not a strictly scientific study, although it was intimately 
related to science. For mathematics entailed exploration of 
the interconnections within the intellectual concepts, or "Funda- 
mental Ideas," without reference to the external phenomena which 
might be impled by such connections. Thus, for example, geometers 
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had clarified and defined the concept of the ellipse within the 
"Fundamental Idea of Space," long before Kepler recognized the 
elliptical form of planetary orbits. Kepler was a scientist 
who was engaged in discovering the implication of Fundamental 
Ideas for particular phenomena. Mathematicians, on the other 
hand, were engaged in working out the intricacies and implications 
of the innate concept without reference to possible physical 
manifestations. 
The truth of mathematical results within Whewell's conceptual 
view of the subject was essentially different from the kind of 
truth one might hope to generate deductively through the logical 
development of an arbitrary series of initially'given principles. 
The difference is illustrated by an argument Whewell developed 
in an essay, "Remarks on Mathematical Reasoning," appended to 
his textbook, The Mechanical Euclid (1837) [21. Here Whewell 
challenged the reasoning of Dougald Steward, whom he interpreted 
as follows: 
The question, What is the foundation of mathematical 
demonstration? was discussed at considerable length 
by Dougald Stewart [Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind, Vol. II (1792)l; and the opinion at which 
he arrived was, that the certainty of mathematical 
reasoning arises from its depending upon definitions. 
He expresses this further, by declaring that mathe- 
matical truth is hypothetical, and must be understood 
as asserting only, that if the definitions are assumed, 
the conclusion follows [Whewell 1837, 1471 
Whewell's argument against Stewart was that it was impossible 
to create purely arbitrary definitions. Using as his example 
the definition "A line is said to be straight . . . when two 
such lines cannot coincide in one point without coinciding al- 
together," Whewell pointed out that 
it would inevitably be remarked, that no such lines 
exist; . . . or, more generally, that the definition 
does not correspond to any conception which we can 
distinctly frame in our thoughts. [Whewell 1837, 1491 
For Whewell, the axioms and theorems of mathematics were de- 
scriptive; the truth of the mathematical construct did not lie 
in its logical connections, but rather in the complicated idea 
which was being analyzed. Mathematics generated real knowledge 
of a subject matter which was qualitatively different from that 
which could be gained through abstract consistency alone. 
Whewell's view of the nature of mathematics seems clearly 
at odds with the possibility of developing an algebraic system 
in which the terms had no referent but were merely defined im- 
plicitly by their position in an algebraic form. However, he 
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was highly satisfied with Peacock's work. This acceptance can 
be explained because he did not interpret Peacock as claiming 
algebra to be an abstract study. Rather, he evaluated algebra 
as yet another instance in which mathematics involved the care- 
ful analysis of a Fundamental Idea, in this case the principle 
of equivalent forms. 
Whewell discussed Peacock's principle in a chapter of his 
Philosophy entitled "The Foundations of Higher Mathematics." 
The issue as he presented it here was again that of the truth 
of such entities as negative or imaginary numbers. In some cases, 
he indicated, results proved through the use of these problematic 
concepts which were generated from granting universality to sym- 
bolic language could also be verified through other modes of 
proof. U But," he continued, 
it has also been shown in many such cases, that the 
process in which some of the steps appear to be without 
real meaning, does in fact involve a valid proof of the 
proposition. And what we have here to remark is . . . 
that the results of systematic symbolical reasoning 
must always express general truths, by their nature, 
and do not, for their justification, require each 
of the steps of the process to represent some defi- 
nite operation upon quantity. The absolute univer- 
sality of the interpretation of symbols is the funda- 
mental principle of their use. This has been shown 
very ably by Dr. Peacock in his Algebra [Whewell 1847 
I, 1491 
The foundation Whewell here recognized for algebra made 
the process of arriving at algebraic truth a twofold one. 
The manipulation of meaningless symbols could lead to results 
without any interpretation imposed upon them: "If we have a 
theorem to prove or a problem to solve which can be brought 
under the domain of our symbols, we may at once state the given 
but unproved truth or the given combination of unknown quantities, 
in its symbolical form." A complete algebraic investigation 
continued another step beyond this, however: "We may then 
proceed to trace, by means of our symbols, what other truth 
is involved in the one stated, or what the unknown symbols 
must signify." Whewell recognized that the first step, which he 
labeled as "synthesis," could be.followed without the second 
"analytic" step. But this did not constitute an algebraic pro- 
cess. The two steps. were inextricably intertwined in any mathe- 
matical investigation, and it was in the analytic step that one 
arrived at a real understanding of the results. This interpre- 
tation was guaranteed by the principle of equivalent forms with 
its assurance of the "absolute universality of the interpretation 
of symbols" [Whewell 1847 I, 1501. 
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AUGUSTUS DEMORGAN AND JOHN HERSCHEL: ALGEBRA WITHOUT 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENT FORMS 
Augustus DeMorgan and the Foundations of Algebra 
Many historians of mathematics have recognized that the 
presence of Peacock's principle of equivalent forms prevents 
attributing to him a view which would find the foundations of 
algebra to lie in a well-defined set of initial assumptions and 
axioms, its truth to depend solely on the consistency of the 
results generated from the posited axioms. In the work of his 
successors, however, hopes have been entertained of discovering 
a real understanding of the nature of abstract algebra. Of 
these sucessors, Augustus DeMorgan, who graduated from Cambridge 
in 1827, is the one whose work seems closest to a modern view. 
His work in algebra, which developed and changed over several 
years, was in many senses more sophisticated than Peacock's. 
He explicitly recognized the commutative and distributive laws 
of addition and multiplication: in his paper "On the Foundation 
of Algebra, No. II" he explicitly laid down the basic axioms of 
a field. DeMorgan seems to have clearly recognized the possibi- 
lity of developing consistent algebras which could have many 
models. At the same time, however, he denied that such an ab- 
stract algebraic system had any significant truth value and 
hence any real interest.. DeMorgan did not insist on the prin- 
ciples of equivalent forms as the basis of algebraic truth. He 
did, however, search for the same kind of truth in his mathematical 
work as Peacock. On the basic view that significant mathematical 
truth adhered in the mathematical subject matter, the two men 
were in complete agreement. 
In the preface to his textbook Elements of Algebra [1837], 
DeMorgan set a tone which he continued through all of his later 
researches. In this work he contrasted the development of al- 
gebra as an "art "--the generation of its results from a set of 
prescribed rules --with its development as a "science," a develop- 
ment which involved keeping always in mind the connecting prin- 
ciples binding together the elements of its subject matter. He 
wrote: 
Algebra as an art, can be of no use to any one in the 
business of life; . . . Taught as an art it is of 
little use in the higher mathematics, as those are 
made to feel who attempt to study the differential 
calculus without knowing more of its principles than 
is contained in books of rules. 
The science of algebra, independently of any 
of its uses, has all the advantages which belong to 
mathematics in general as an object of study. . . . 
[DeMorgan 18371 
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This separation of the study of algebra into two parts is re- 
peated throughout DeMorgan's writings on the subject. Thus, 
in his paper "On the Foundations of Algebra," delivered to the 
Cambridge Philosophical Society on December 9, 1839, he dis- 
tinguished technical algebra, "the art of using symbols under 
regulations which, when this part of the subject is considered 
independently of the other, are prescribed as the definitions 
of the symbols," from logical algebra, "the science which in- 
vestigates the method of giving meaning to the primary symbols, 
and of interpreting all subsequent symbolic results" [DeMorgan 
1839, 1731. Having made this distinction, which clearly paral- 
lels the one between algebra as art and algebra as science, 
DeMorgan proceeded to elaborate on the complete algebraic pro- 
cess which involved both of these aspects. He wrote: 
Thus a symbol is defined when such rules are laid 
down for its use as will enable us to accept or 
reject any proposed transformation of it, or by 
means of it. A simple symbol is explained when 
such a meaning is given to it as will enable us 
to accept or reject the application of its defini- 
tion as a consequence of that meaning; and a com- 
pound symbol is interpreted, when, having occurred 
as a result of explained elements, used under 
prescribed definitions, a necessary meaning can 
be given to it; the necessity arising from the 
tacit supposition that the compound symbol,consi- 
dered as a new simple one, must still be subject 
to the prescribed definitions, when it subsequently 
comes in contact with other symbols (emphasis mine). 
[DeMorgan 1839, 1741 
In this description of the process of algebra, DeMorgan does 
not maintain it as an abstract study. As in Peacock's formula- 
tion, terms are "defined" implicitly by their position with the 
forms. But like his mentor, DeMorgan claimed that a complete 
algebraic investigation does not stop here. It continues through 
"explanation,11 i.e. the assignation of meaning to the simple 
symbols, which is followed by an "interpretation" in the con- 
text of the subject matter of whatever new results may have been 
generated. 
For DeMorgan, it was this whole process which was involved 
in the study of algebra, not simply the first step of generating 
technical algebra. Furthermore, it was the final operation of 
interpretation which supplied the truth value of the system. 
This is clear, for example, in the development of a metaphor 
which appeared several places in his work. DeMorgan sometimes 
drew an analogy between the part of algebra which earlier he 
had called technical, and the possiblility of learning to put 
together a jigsaw puzzle, depicting a map of Europe, with the 
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pieces lying face down on a table. One could, DeMorgan pointed 
out, become very proficient at the skill of putting together 
the pieces without knowing the meaning of what was being done. 
Similarly, a student could become very proficient at the mani- 
pulation of a group of symbols according to a set of rules given 
by his teacher without knowing the meaning which was to be as- 
signed. In both of DeMorgan's examples, the system thus ab- 
stractly generated was one which had originated with meaning-- 
either in the reverse side of the puzzle, or in the teacher's 
mind. But after its terms had been thus suggested, one could 
develop the results of an algebraic system without reference to 
an external referent. Thus DeMorgan recognized the possiblity 
of working within a closed algebraic system. He did not, how- 
ever, consider that this was doing algebra. As he wrote in a 
paper read to the Cambridge Philosphical Society in 1841, 
. . . a person who puts one of these [dissected maps 
or pictures] together by the backs of the pieces, and 
therefore is guided only by their forms, and not by 
their meanings, may be compared to one who makes the 
transformations of algebra by the defined laws of 
operation only; while one who looks at the fronts 
and converts his general knowledge of the countries 
painted on them into one of a more particular kind 
by help of the forms of the pieces, more resembles 
the investigator and the mathematician. [DeMorgan 
1841, 289-2901 
DeMorgan was categorical in his opinion of what was required 
for a significant algebraic investigation: "No science of symbols 
can be fully presented to the mind, in such a state as to demand 
assent or dissent, until its peculiar symbols, their meanings 
and the rules of operation are all stated" [DeMorgan 1849, 901. 
Despite his explicit recognition of the possiblility of developing 
an abstract system with no explicit model, his commitment to the 
search for a truth similar to that found by the map-studying 
geographer ruled such an investigation to be useless and es- 
sentially uninteresting. 
Throughout his life, DeMorqan persisted in attempting to 
discover the universal interpretation of algebraic forms, a sys- 
tem which would render every possible algebraic expression in- 
telligible. His commitment to the ultimate possibility of such 
an interpretation was reflected,for example, in his refusal to 
discount divergent series although he fully admitted that they 
were useless under contemporary interpretations of the symbols. 
As he wrote in 1844: 
We must admit that many series are such as we cannot 
at present safely use, except as a means of discovery 
the results of which are to be subsequently verified: 
. . . But to say that what we cannot use no others 
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ever can, to refuse that faith in the future prospects 
of algebra which has already realized so brilliant a 
harvest, and to train the future promoter of analysis 
in a notion which will necessarily prevent him from 
turning his steps to quarters from whence his prede- 
cessors have never returned empty-handed, seems to me a 
departure from all rules of prudence. TDeMorgan 1844, 
1831 
It was in continuing attempts to find interpretations for the 
algebraic forms that DeMorgan hoped to further the process of 
algebra [31. In his quest after algebraic interpretation, 
DeMorgan did not follow a nativist, Whewellian approach to truth 
by relying on the principle of equivalent forms as had Peacock. 
He took a different approach , which can be clarified by looking 
at the philosophical writings of another contemporary Englishman, 
John Herschel. 
Separated by about ten years in age, Herschel and DeMorgan 
were close friends, and their correspondence reveals important 
agreements about the nature of mathematical truth. Although 
Herschel devoted himself primarily to scientific pursuits, he 
did make a brief foray into the philosophy of science in 1831, 
when he published A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of 
Natural Philosophy. Here he espoused an empirical philosophy 
in important ways opposed to Whewell's nativism. Herschel speci- 
fically elaborated the similarities and differences between their 
approaches in 1841, when he published a long review of Whewell's 
work in the Quarterly Review. In the philosophical outlook which 
Herschel expounded in the Preliminary Discourse and in his 
"Review," one can find a clear expression of the approach reflected 
in DeMorgan's algebraic work. 
JOHN HERSCHEL: ALGEBRA IN PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT THE 
PRINICIPLE OF EQUIVALENT FORMS 
As was the case with Whewell, Herschel's theory of scientific 
induction provides the entree into his thought which ultimately 
leads to his views of the nature of mathematics. He advocated 
an empirical view of induction and hence rejected Whewell's in- 
nate Fundamental Ideas. Whereas Whewell had seen mathematical 
study as the description of a complex intellectual construct, 
Herschel's empiricism led him to believe mathematics to have a 
concrete, objective subject matter. Space, the subject of geometry, 
was an external reality: magnitude, the subject of arithmetic, 
was also an objective fact. The mathematical relations, which 
held among elements of the object of mathematical study, were 
recognized by the human mind, and hence, could be studied intel- 
lectually. 
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In this view, the only distinction between science and mathe- 
matics is one of degree. In those sciences which are generally 
considered inductive, the passage from experience to inductive 
principles is a difficult process, enough so that much of the 
effort, historically, to generate the sciences has been expended 
on it. In mathematics, however, the experiences of which it 
treats are so universal, its relations so simple, that the basic 
axioms have been easily found. 
This formulation of the nature of mathematical study, in 
which its subject matter is the intellectualized elementary parts 
of an objective subject mater developed without reference to the 
external world, would seem to bring Herschel to admit that actual 
mathematical study involved a purely logical, deductive process. 
However, for Herschel, the intimate connection between intellec- 
tual mathematical study and its objective subject matter was not 
nullified by the mere act of abstracting an axiomatic description. 
Herschel's treatment of this issue clearly indicates the nature 
of the mathematical truth to which he aspired. 
In his 1841 "Review," Herschel wrote briefly: "The only 
tests of abstract truth are its entire consistency in itself and 
accordance with its exemplification in particulars" [Herschel 1841, 
2191. Except for the second phrase insisting on "exemplifica- 
tion in particulars," this statement seems to affirm an approach 
which would support the abstract development of an algebraic 
system. Further perusal of Herschel's discussion, however, re- 
veal that Herschel's views were incompatible with such an inter- 
pretation. 
There are two closely related paragraphs in which Herschel 
treats this issue. The first of these concerns the question of 
whether consistency is a property which can be said to subsist 
in a group of abstract axioms without reference to concrete mod- 
el. He concluded that it cannot and emphasized the importance 
of an interpretation for any consistency judgment. He wrote: 
The test of truth by its application to particulars 
being laid aside, nothing remains but its self- 
consistency to guide us in its recognition. But 
this in axiomatic propositions amounts to no test 
at all. . . . Their [axioms] mutual compatibility 
as fundamental elements of the same body of truth, 
can only be shown by experience--by the observed 
fact of their co-existence as literal truths in a 
particular case produced. [Herschel 1841, 2201 
Thus, one can only be confident of the consistency of a given 
group of axioms when one can construct a model within an already 
accepted mathematical structure or idea, which can be interpreted 
through the axioms of the system. 
In a second paragraph, Herschel considered the issue of ab- 
stract mathematical truth from a different angle. Here he re- 
vealed the same basic unwillingenss to consider abstract mathe- 
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matical systems as containing any significant truth which can 
be found in DeMorgan. 
It may, however, be alleged, that one criteron 
of abstract truth remains unconsidered--its direct 
recognition in the abstract without mental reference . . . 
to any example, to any experience. How truth may or 
may not impress conviction in other minds, it is 
doubtless presumptuous to assert, for which reason 
we have dwelt only on the received tests of truth, 
as conveyed from mind to mind by the intervention of 
language. If there be those who can persuade them- 
selves that they are yielding a rational assent to 
the terms of an abstract proposition on the mere 
jingle of its sound in their ears, while refusing 
to test it by calling up in their minds those images 
with their attributes, which experience has inseparably 
associated with its words, they have certainly a 
very different notion of logical evidence from our 
own. IHerschel 1841, 221-2221 
Like Demorgan, Herschel did not deny the possibility of con- 
structing mathematical systems without reference to a particu- 
lar interpretation. He did, however, deny the legitimacy of 
developing such a system and claiming thereby to have arrived 
at truth. 
Herschel's attitude toward truth is clearly the same as that 
to which DeMorgan adhered. DeMorgan put the case clearly in a 
letter of 1842 to Herschel in which he noted: 
Is there not a confused way of talking about 
truth? When we prove a truth, that is, give our- 
selves certain knowledge of its being a truth, we 
talk as if we had made a truth. We say "one pro- 
position is the consequence of another;" when it 
should be "our knowledge of one proposition is the 
consequence of our knowledge of another." [S. DeMorgan 
1882, 1471 
For DeMorgan, mathematics remained the development of a des- 
cription about a particular subject matter. 
The issue which controlled mid-19th-century English views 
of algebraic foundations is that of truth. Although DeMorgan 
and Herschel's interpretation of mathematics was somewhat dif- 
ferent from Peacock and Whewell's, clearly all four were com- 
mitted to a search for mathematical truth which was inherent in 
a particular subject matter, rather than the logical development 
of the abstract structure itself. The context of the English 
algebraists' strict adherence to a concrete view of mathematics 
can be seen in the wider perspective on the human intellectual 
endeavor within which their mathematical views were embedded. 
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THE UNITARY VIEW OF TRUTH IN EARLY VICTORIAN BRITAIN 
All of the mathematicians discussed in this paper--Peacock, 
Whewell, DeMorgan, and Herschel-- are included in a group of 
English intellectuals that Susan Cannon has labeled the "Cambridge 
Network" [Cannon 1978, Chap. 33. Cannon makes the point that 
these men shared a perception of human intellectual potential. 
Briefly, they believed in a single and absolute truth which was 
the goal of all human investigation in any area. Thus, for ex- 
ample, the truth about the nature of man to which one aspired in 
a biological investigation was essentially complementary to that 
truth which was sought in a religious context. Thus one could 
come to an understanding of God scientifically through tracing 
evidences of his design in the physical world. The understanding 
one could reach in this way was essentially the same as that 
reached through any other nonscientific route. In Herschel's 
words, "the grand and indeed only character of truth is its 
capability of enduring the test of universal experience, and 
coming unchanged out of every possible form of fair discussion" 
[Herschel 1831, 731. 
Science and scientific investigation could therefore play a 
central role in the broader humanistic quest after truth. Fur- 
thermore, it served as the template against which the validity 
of all knowledge was tested; in Cannon's words, science stood 
as the "norm" of truth. The epistemological scope and powers 
of the scientific model of investigation are suggested by the 
opening sentence of Whewell's Philosophy: 
The Philosophy of Science, if the pharase were to be 
understood in the comprehensive sense which'most 
naturally offers itself to our thoughts, would imply 
nothing less than a complete insight into the essence 
and conditions of all real knowledge, and an exposi- 
tion of the best methods for the discovery of new 
truths [Whewell 1847 I, 11. 
By thus adopting science as the "norm" of truth, however, 
members of the Cambridge Network were faced with a fundamental 
question about the nature of the knowledge to which man could 
aspire. If all that man could know of the world was his experience 
of phenomena, and if scientific knowledge consisted of generalized 
statements about experience, then there was no guarantee that 
one could ever penetrate beyond generalized descriptions and 
understand the essence of the universe. Scientific investigation 
might lead to general descriptive laws, but one could not claim 
to have thereby reached real knowlege of the truth behind the 
appearances. Any number of realities might fit a given general 
description; there was no guarantee that the scientific interpre- 
tation was true. 
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The possibility that the natural philosopher might not be 
even thoretically able to discover the essence of reality was 
explicitly recognized in Herschel's Preliminary Discourse. In 
this work, Herschel remained an agnostic concerning man's abi- 
lity to find real truth through science. The mission of the 
natural philosopher, he wrote, lay in 
the endeavor to discover, as far as our faculties will 
permit, what are these primary qualities originally 
and unalterably impressed on matter, and to discover 
the spirit of the laws of nature, which includes 
groups and classes of relations and facts from the 
letter which . . . is presented to us by single 
phenomena: or if, after all, this should prove 
impossible; if such a step be beyond our faculties; 
and the essential qualities of material agents be 
real1 y occult, or incapable of being expressed in 
any form intelligible to our understandings, at 
least to approach as near to their comprehension 
as the nature of the case will allow; and devise 
such forms of words as shall include and represent 
the greatest possible multitude and variety of 
phenomena. [Herschel 1831, 291 
Here Herschel appears to have subscribed to the view that 
the human mind might not necessarily reflect external reality; 
that scientific theories which were merely drawn from experience 
might not capture the essence of the plan of existence. In a 
later work, however, he forcefully modified this agnostic view. 
By positing a somewhat ad hoc form of divine intervention in 
the empirical learning process, he was able to assert that in 
his philosophy, 
the mind of man is represented as in harmony 
with universal nature; that we are capable of 
attaining real knowledge; and the design and in- 
telligence which we trace through creation is no 
visionary conception, but a truth as certain as the 
existence of that creation itself. IHerschel 1841, 
1821 
In the heyday of natural theology, when science stood as the 
"norm of truth," it was critically important that the mind of 
man be represented as in harmony with universal knowledge. On 
this connection hung all of man's hopes for knowing the essence 
of the universe, for understanding both its design and its de- 
designer. 
Whewell wrote about this basic epistemological problem more 
extensively than did Herschel. His approach was to develop 
carefully the distinction Herschel had drawn between knowinq 
the "spirit of the laws of nature" and merely knowing the "letter 
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which . . . is presented to us by single phenomena." Whewell 
drew a sharp distinction between contingent truths, which were 
merely descriptive, and necessary truths, which captured the 
essence of phenomena. Contingent truths were observed facts 
about phenomena which "for aught we can see . . . might have 
been otherwise" [Whewell 1844, 1701. 
Whewell illustrated the distinction between necessary and con- 
tingent truth with the cases of Kepler's and Newton's work on 
elliptical planetary orbits. When Kepler concluded that planets 
rotated in elliptical orbits it was certainly imaginable to him 
that they might have followed a different path; it was only his 
observational data which led him to believe they followed el- 
liptical orbits. In Whewell's mind, this kind of understanding 
of planetary orbits stood in marked contrast to Newton's. Be- 
cause he understood the nature of force, Newton knew not only 
that the orbits were elliptical but also that they could be no- 
thing but elliptical. In his clearly conceived concept of force, 
Newton's mind was in essential harmony with the external world. 
Whereas Kepler had developed only a contingent, descriptive gen- 
eralization, Newton knew the form of planetary orbits necessarily. 
Whewell's category of necessary truth was a difficult one, 
but it was critically important for the assurance that man really 
could come to know his world. He used the example of mathematics 
to prove the reality of this kind of truth. Thus, in geometry 
he pointed out, one not only knew that the sum of the angles of 
a triangle was 180'; it was impossible to imagine that it could 
be otherwise. When it was fully understood, it was impossible 
to conceive of the opposite of any mathematical theorem. Hence, 
in mathematics there was no difference between objective reality 
and subjective knowledge; the human mind was completely in tune 
with external fact. Mathematical truth was the epitome of nec- 
essary truth. Thus Whewell wrote: 
. . . if any person does not fully apprehend, at 
first, the different kinds of truth thus pointed 
out [contingent and necessary], let him study, to 
some extent, those sciences which have necessary 
truth for their subject, as geometry [the study of 
space], or the properties of numbers [arithmetic] I 
so as to obtain a familiar acquaintance with such 
truth; and he will then hardly fail to see how 
different the evidence of the propositions which 
occur in these sciences, is from the evidence of 
the facts which are merely learnt from experience. 
[Whewell 1847 I, 581 
Whewell's advocacy of the study of mathematics as the exem- 
plar of necessary truth was not an isolated exhortation to prove 
an obscure philosophical point. On the contrary, it constituted 
the justification for the study of mathematics at Cambridge 
University, the center of mathematics in mid-19th-century England. 
BM7 The Art and the Science of British Algebra 363 
The Cambridge education, which culminated in the mathematical 
Tripos, was not intended to produce mathematical specialists. 
Bather, its goal was a liberal education in which young men 
would develop basic skills and knowledge. The study of mathe- 
matics formed the major part of the educational enterprise be- 
cause it would most directly enable students to come to know the 
nature of truth, and thus to recognize it in any context. The 
rationale for pursuing mathematical studies in a culture which 
provided only minimal support for any scientific activity lay 
in the critically important role of mathematical truth in a 
widely held view of man's intellectual endeavor. 
Within this framework for the interpretation of truth and 
its corollary view of the nature of the human intellectual enter- 
prise, Peacock and D-organ's insistence that an alegebraic in- 
vestigation have an interpretation becomes more comprehensible. 
The truth of logical consistency was seen as qualitatively dif- 
ferent from the truth for which they were seeking, since it had 
no real world implication. It might well be possible to develop 
an algebra from a series of arbitrary axioms, but such a develop- 
ment would be inherently without interest. 
Further, however, to locate the foundation of algebra in an 
essentially arbitrary axiom system was to challenge the validity 
of the whole search after truth in which they were engaged. For 
it involved creating an intellectual algebraic truth which could 
be seen as more or less applicable to a given situation, but 
which was not inextricably intertwined with the essence of the 
external world. The necessary character of mathematical truth 
would be destroyed if the subjective and objective worlds were 
no longer seen as in essential harmony in mathematical investi- 
gation. 
Thus, in mid-19th-century England, the study of mathematics 
was philosophically perceived and institutionally encouraged as 
a part of a unified search after truth which encompassed not only 
mathematical research, but all other intellectual endeavors of 
man as well. Its status in this context was not a neutral one; 
it served as the exemplification and justification of a view 
which held the search for scientific truth as a critical part 
of man's highest endeavor. Mathematics provided direct corrobo- 
ration of the faith that man could ultimately be sucessful in 
his search after truth, and in an age of growing doubt served 
as an anchor for the belief that knowledge of the working of 
God's will could be found. Changing the view of mathematics as 
a science into the abstract view abhorred by DeMorgan, that "one 
proposition is the consequence of another," would involve not 
only an alteration in the perception of mathematics, but a major 
challenge to the prevailing perception of man's place in the 
universe. 
The mid-19th-century English algebraists did not change this 
basic view of mathematical truth, despite the fact that from a 
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modern point of view such a change might seem almost an inevit- 
able result of their mathematical researches. In their investi- 
gations of the foundations of algebra they seem to have recog- 
nized the possibility of formal mathematical development, that 
one could explore empty mathematical forms without reference to 
a particular subject matter. However, such a pursuit was meaning- 
less in the context of the overarching view of truth within 
which they perceived mathematics. In this context their "failure" 
to develop abstract algebra, which has puzzled the most careful 
mathematical historians, becomes comprehensible. 
NOTES 
1. I am using this term in Peacock's 19th-century sense, 
not in the 20th-century sense introduced by Hilbert. The 19th 
century use of the term is illustrated in a letter from DeMorgan 
to J. S. Mill, February 5, 1865: "Peacock had very nearly attained 
the idea of algebra as a formal science, in which every result of 
the form is to have meaning. His permanence of equivalent forms 
would have developed itself into formal algebra capable of any 
number of material applications, if he had been a logician. . .'I 
[S. DeMorgan 1882, 3281. 
2. The bulk of this argument was also included in the 
chapter "Of Some Objections Which Have Been Made to the 
Doctrines Stated in the Previous Chapter," in Whewell 1.28471. 
3. DeMorgan explicitly stated his algebraic goals in a 
letter to J. S. Mill, February 5, 1865: "For myself, it is my 
taste, if you please that I will have a formal algebra, in which 
every form, every law of transformation is universal. I admit 
that we have not yet arrived at it, but.1 have entire faith in 
the future" [S. DeMorgan 1882, 3291. 
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